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I.   TWO KINDS OF HARM 
 While it may not be quite right to say that there are two kinds of 
hate speech, there are perhaps two general kinds of harm caused by 
hate speech. The first kind of harm is that suffered by the members 
of a racial, or other, target group (the group that is both the subject 
and audience of the hate speech). This form of harm includes fear, in-
timidation, insult, and emotional trauma. The second kind of harm is 
the spread of hateful views in the community or, in less general 
terms, the instilling of hateful attitudes about the members of a mi-
nority racial group in the minds of members of the general commu-
nity. The type of harm caused by a particular instance of hate speech 
will depend significantly on the audience to which the speech is di-
rected. The same speech act, of course, may contribute to both kinds 
of harm. 
 While the leading hate speech cases in the United States involve 
laws that respond to the first kind of harm, threats and insults, the 
Canadian cases generally involve the second kind of harm, the 
spread of hateful views in the community. The challenge to freedom 
of expression is different depending on the type of harm the law 
seeks to prevent. Laws that address the first harm are in principle 
reconcilable with a commitment to freedom of expression. However, 
the hate speech laws in the Canadian cases, addressing the second 
kind of harm, represent a more significant challenge to freedom       
of expression.  
II.   THE U.S. CASES—THREATS AND INSULTS 
 In the United States, the leading hate speech cases involve racist 
threats and insults against racial/ethnic groups.1 The restriction of 
this speech may involve some difficult line-drawing but is in princi-
                                                                                                      
 ∗  Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, Canada. 
 1. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992) (involving a cross-
burning on the front yard of a black family who lived across the street from the petitioner).  
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ple compatible with a commitment to freedom of expression.2 In 
Collin v. Smith,3 a municipality sought to prevent a neo-Nazi march 
in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood, which included a large 
number of Holocaust survivors.4 The Federal Court of Appeals held 
that the march was protected speech under the First Amendment.5 
 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,6 two young men, who planted a burn-
ing cross on the front lawn of a black family that had moved into a 
previously all-white neighborhood, were charged under an ordinance 
that prohibited the placing on public property of racist symbols, such 
as swastikas and burning crosses.7 The U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the municipal law, although directed at “fighting words,” 
breached the First Amendment because it was not content neutral.8 
The law prohibited racist symbols but not the speech of antiracists, 
and Justice Scalia said, “St. Paul has no such authority to license one 
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow 
Marquis of Queensberry rules.”9 
 In the more recent case of Virginia v. Black,10 the U.S. Supreme 
Court suggested that a state could prohibit cross-burning when it 
was intended to intimidate.11 The Court observed that cross-burnings 
had been used by the Ku Klux Klan to threaten and intimidate and 
had often been a prelude to violent action.12 The Court, however, 
struck down the Virginia cross-burning law.13 While the law formally 
prohibited the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any 
person or group, it included a provision that “ ‘[a]ny such burning . . . 
shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.’ ”14 The Court 
was concerned that this presumption might result in conviction even 
                                                                                                      
 2. Brandenburg v. Ohio remains the leading U.S. case dealing with general incite-
ment. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the Court held that the state could prohibit 
advocacy only if it “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is like-
ly to incite or produce such action.” Id. at 447. 
 3. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 4. Id. at 1199. 
 5. Id. at 1201. 
 6. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 7. Id. at 380. The ordinance stated that  
[w]hoever places on public . . . property a symbol, object, appellation, charac-
terization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi 
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.  
Id. 
 8. Id. at 391. 
 9. Id. at 392. 
 10. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 11. Id. at 363. 
 12. Id. at 354. 
 13. Id. at 367. 
 14. Id. at 348.  
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when the purpose behind the cross-burning was not to intimidate 
others, but was instead to affirm “a statement of ideology” or        
“group solidarity.”15 
  Under established accounts of freedom of expression, racist 
threats may have some value inasmuch as they express personal 
feelings or convey some kind of crude political viewpoint. However, 
the limited value of these acts must be weighed against the intended 
and significant injury to others. The meaning and force of a racist 
threat depends significantly on the larger background of racist ex-
pression and action. A burning cross, planted in front of the home of 
the first black family to move into a previously all-white neighbor-
hood, is experienced as threatening because it evokes the history of 
Klan violence against blacks. Similarly, a march with swastikas and 
SS uniforms in a Jewish neighborhood is experienced as threatening 
because it evokes the history of Nazi persecution of Jews. Even if 
these threats do not seem realistic or immediate to an outside ob-
server, they must be viewed from the perspective of a target group 
member who experiences them as part of a continuing practice of vio-
lence against his or her group. The history and context of violence 
gives rise to genuine and understandable fear and insecurity. Even if 
the members of the target group know that the threat cannot be car-
ried out (although it is not clear why they would feel confident about 
this), it is so closely linked to a larger practice of violent oppression 
that it is bound to cause significant anxiety and upset. The broader 
context of racist violence provides a basis for distinguishing unac-
ceptable threats from “the rough and tumble of public debate,”16 
which is sometimes unpleasant and impolite. Even if we accept that 
the neo-Nazi march manifests some kind of political solidarity among 
its participants or amounts to a political statement to other members 
of the community who witness it or hear about it, the march is, in the 
first instance, a threat against the Jewish residents of the neighbor-
hood. Any political meaning or significance the march may have 
stems from its threatening character.17 
                                                                                                      
 15. Id. at 365-66. 
 16. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 779 (Can.).  
 17. In R.A.V., Justice Scalia wondered, “What makes the anger, fear, sense of 
dishonor, etc., produced by violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of 
dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is nothing other than the fact that it is 
caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1992). He observed that under the ordinance “[o]ne could hold up a 
sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all 
‘papists’ are, for that would insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’ ” Id. at 
391-92. However, the history and context of violent racist action provides the basis for 
distinguishing racist symbols, such as a burning cross, from the angry speech of          
antiracist activists.  
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 The context of racist violence and discrimination may also provide 
a basis for treating racist insults differently from other insults. Rac-
ist insults are different not only because they are often a prelude to 
violent behavior, but also because the context of violence, discrimina-
tion, and oppression adds significantly to their emotional impact. As 
well, a racist insult is not an isolated occurrence. The frequent ex-
pression of racial insults (coming from different sources) means that 
they cannot easily be avoided by individual target group members. 
Each insult is experienced as part of a practice of harassment that 
gives rise to a general injury of emotional upset, humiliation, and 
fear. It is now widely accepted, at least in Canada, that racist insults 
should be restricted in the workplace18 and in the schools.19 In the 
workplace or school, insults are difficult to avoid. The environment is 
both closed and hierarchical, and so a higher standard of civility may 
reasonably be expected. However, any ban (and certainly a general 
ban) on racist insults raises a variety of line-drawing issues such as 
the distinction between a racist insult and a claim or argument about 
race or the distinction between a derogatory term used against a par-
ticular group and the same term used by members of that group to 
describe themselves.20  
III.   THE CANADIAN CASES—HARMFUL PERSUASION 
 The leading hate speech cases in Canada, R. v. Keegstra21 and 
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor,22 involve the regula-
tion of racist claims that are meant to persuade members of the gen-
eral community about the dangerous or undesirable character of par-
ticular minority groups. The concern in these cases is that those who 
hear racist opinions may come to view the target group differently 
and act towards its members in a discriminatory or violent way.23 
Hate speech, in this form, damages the group’s position in the com-
munity because it changes or reinforces the way that members of the 
dominant group think about the target group and its members.  
 Yet freedom of expression is said to be valuable because the free 
exchange of information and ideas is necessary to the formation of 
public opinion and to the realization/creation of individual and group 
identity. The thoughts, feelings, and more generally the identity take 
                                                                                                      
 18. See, e.g., Hinds v. Can. (Employment & Immigration Comm’n.), [1988] 24 C.C.E.L. 
65 (Canadian Human Rights Trib.). 
 19. See, e.g., Ross v. N.B. Sch. Dist. No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, 886 (Can.).  
 20. An example of the latter is the self-identification as “queer” by many gays and 
lesbians in an attempt to neutralize or transform the term’s derogatory connotation. The 
law, of course, does not always deal well with this sort of context-based distinction. 
 21. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
 22. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (Can.). 
 23. Id. at 918-19. 
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shape in public discourse. Critical views cannot be restricted simply 
because they affect how an individual is regarded by others in the 
community and how that individual sees himself or herself. The 
standard freedom of expression position is that ideas cannot be cen-
sored simply because we fear that members of the community may 
find them persuasive or that an individual’s self-understanding or 
self-esteem may be negatively affected. We should respond to racist 
claims not with censorship, but by offering competing views that 
make the case for equal respect or by creating more avenues for mar-
ginalized groups to express themselves.  
 The Canadian cases involve a fundamental challenge to conven-
tional freedom of expression theory and doctrine. The courts in Can-
ada have sought to reconcile the regulation of hate speech with the 
constitutional commitment to freedom of expression, first by requir-
ing that the restricted speech be shown to cause harm—to generate 
hatred in the community—and second by limiting the scope of the re-
striction to a narrow category of extreme or hateful speech. The prob-
lem with the courts’ approach, though, is that it is difficult to see how 
a particular instance of racist speech, however extreme, causes or 
leads others to hate. The spread or reinforcement of hatred in the 
community is a systemic problem. No particular instance of expres-
sion causes hatred, but a wide range of racist statements (some ex-
treme and some more temperate and even commonplace) may con-
tribute to racist or hateful attitudes in the community. The causation 
requirement seems to lead to the conclusion that either no hate 
speech is caught by the ban (since no statement alone causes hatred) 
or that all racist or bigoted expression is caught (as part of the sys-
tem of racist speech that supports the spread of racism). 
 Before examining the leading Canadian case, I should say a little 
bit about the Canadian courts’ general approach to freedom of ex-
pression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
IV.   THE TEST FOR A BREACH OF 2(B) 
 According to the Supreme Court of Canada, section 2(b) protects 
any activity that “conveys or attempts to convey a meaning.”24 An act 
of expression is distinguished from other voluntary human acts by 
the intention with which it is performed. If the act is intended by the 
actor to convey a message to someone, then it is an act of expression 
                                                                                                      
 24. Taylor, 3 S.C.R. at 913-14. Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms provides that “ ‘[e]veryone has the following fundamental freedoms: . . . (b) freedom 
of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication . . . .’ ” Id. at 907. The basic test for determining whether section 2(b) has 
been breached was set out in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can.). For a 
more general examination of the court’s approach to freedom of expression, see R. MOON, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2000).  
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and prima facie protected under section 2(b).25 Protection is given “ir-
respective of the particular meaning or message sought to be con-
veyed.”26 This is because “in a free, pluralistic and democratic society 
we prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value 
both to the community and to the individual.”27 In a variety of deci-
sions, the court has held that the category of human acts intended to 
carry a message, and so protected under section 2(b), includes adver-
tising,28 picketing,29 defamation,30 hate promotion,31 soliciting for the 
purposes of prostitution,32 and pornography.33 
 There are two exceptions to the court’s broad definition of the 
scope of freedom of expression under section 2(b). First, the court has 
said that a violent act, even if intended to carry a message, does not 
fall within the scope of section 2(b).34 The court has also narrowed the 
scope of section 2(b) by drawing a distinction between two different 
kinds of state restriction on expressive activity: (1) state acts that 
have as their purpose the restriction of expression; and (2) state acts 
that do not have this purpose but nevertheless have this effect.35 The 
significance of the purpose/effect distinction, which roughly parallels 
the distinction in American jurisprudence between content restric-
tions and time, place, and manner restrictions, is that a law that is 
intended to limit expression, and in particular the expression of cer-
tain messages, will be found to violate section 2(b) automatically, 
while a law that simply has the effect of limiting expression will be 
found to violate section 2(b) only if the person attacking the law can 
show that the restricted expression advances the values that under-
lie freedom of expression.36  
Once the court has determined that the state has restricted 
expression protected by section 2(b), it then considers whether the 
restriction is justified under section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 pro-
vides that the rights in the Charter may be “subject only to such rea-
sonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
                                                                                                      
 25. Irwin Toy Ltd., 1 S.C.R. at 969.  
 26. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 729 (Can.).  
 27. Irwin Toy Ltd., 1 S.C.R. at 968.  
 28. See Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons of Ont., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232,           
244 (Can.). 
 29. See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 588 (Can.).  
 30. See Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1188 (Can.). 
 31. See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 733. 
 32. See Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 1123, 1134 (Can.).  
 33. See R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 488 (Can.).  
 34. In Montréal v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., the Supreme Court of Canada enlarged this 
exception. [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (Can.). According to the court, “[w]hile all expressive content 
is worthy of protection . . . , the method or location of the expression may not be.” Id.         
at 167. 
 35. Irwin Toy, Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 978 (Can.). 
 36. Id. at 976. 
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free and democratic society.”37 The court asks whether the restricting 
law has a substantial purpose, advances the law’s purpose rationally, 
impairs the freedom no more than is necessary, and is proportionate 
to the impairment of the freedom.38  
V.   APPLICATION OF THE TEST IN R. V. KEEGSTRA 
 In Canada, a variety of laws prohibit hateful statements. The ex-
pression of racist views is restricted by the Canadian Criminal Code 
and by federal and provincial human rights codes.39 Both forms of 
regulation have been challenged in the courts and upheld as justified 
limits on freedom of expression.40 In Keegstra, the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld the Criminal Code ban on the wilful promotion of ha-
tred under section 319(2).41 This section of the Code provides that 
“[e]very one who, by communicating statements, other than in pri-
vate conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable 
group” commits an offense, punishable for a term of up to two years.42 
                                                                                                      
 37. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).  
 38. The basic test for determining whether a limitation is justified under section 1 
was set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). For a discussion of limits on expres-
sion, see Richard Moon, Justified Limits on Free Expression: The Collapse of the General 
Approach to Limits on Charter Rights, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (2002). 
 39. Section 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada bans the incitement of hatred and 
the wilful promotion of hatred. The section provides as follows:  
(1) Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites 
hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to 
a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to im-
prisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on 
summary conviction.  
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conver-
sation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of (a) 
an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two 
years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.  
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(1)-(2) (1985) (Can.); see also Human Rights, Citizen-
ship and Multiculturalism Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14, § 3(1) (1996) (Can.) (province of Al-
berta); Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C., 210, § 7 (1996) (Can.) (province of British Columbia); 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, R.S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1, § 13 (1989) (Can.) (province       
of Saskatchewan). 
 40. See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 795 (Can.) (upholding restriction of 
racist views under the Canadian Criminal Code). 
 41. Id. at 795.  
 42. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(2) (1985) (Can.). Section 319(3) of the 
Criminal Code provides a number of defenses:  
No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2) 
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true; 
(b) if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an 
opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text; 
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the discus-
sion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he be-
lieved them to be true; or 
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 James Keegstra was a teacher in the high school in the small 
town of Eckville, Alberta.43 For almost ten years, he taught his stu-
dents about an all-encompassing conspiracy on the part of Jews to 
undermine Christianity and control the world.44 He taught his stu-
dents that “the banking system, the media, Hollywood, the universi-
ties, most publishers, most of the churches and almost all political 
leaders were agents of this conspiracy.”45 He told his students that 
Jews were “ ‘treacherous,’ ‘subversive,’ ‘sadistic,’ ‘money-loving,’ 
‘power hungry,’ and ‘child killers.’ ”46 He used the teachers’ punish-
ment and reward powers to ensure that his students parroted his 
theories and ideas.47 Students who did not adopt or acquiesce in his 
views did poorly in his class.48 When Keegstra’s teaching finally be-
came a public issue, he was dismissed from his position.49 A year 
later, he was charged under section 319(2) of the Criminal Code with 
wilfully promoting hatred.50 
 Keegstra challenged the constitutionality of section 319(2), argu-
ing that it violated his freedom of expression under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.51 Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the major-
ity of the Supreme Court of Canada, accepted that section 319(2) of 
the Criminal Code restricted “expression” so that the provision vio-
lated freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.52 How-
ever, he found that the restriction was justified under section 1, the 
Charter’s limitation provision, because it limited “a special category 
of expression which strays some distance from the spirit of s. 2(b),” 
advanced the important goal of preventing the spread of racist ideas, 
and advanced this goal rationally and with minimal impairment to 
                                                                                                      
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, mat-
ters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred towards an identifiable 
group in Canada. 
Id. § 319(3). 
 Subsection (7) provides definitions and clarifications of some of the important terms 
used in the section. In particular, “ ‘communicating’ ” is said to include “communicating by 
telephone, broadcasting or other audible or visible means”; “ ‘identifiable group’ means any 
section of the public identified by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin or sexual orientation”; 
“ ‘public place’ includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by invita-
tion, express or implied”; and finally, the term “ ‘statements’ ” is broadly defined to include 
“words spoken or written or recorded electronically or electro-magnetically or otherwise,” 
as well as “gestures, signs or other visible representations.” Id. §§ 318 (4), 319(7). 
 43. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 713. 
 44. Id. at 713-14. 
 45. DAVID BERCUSON & DOUGLAS WERTHEIMER, A TRUST BETRAYED: THE KEEGSTRA 
AFFAIR 63 (1985) (examining the background of the Keegstra case).  
 46. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 714. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 713. 
 51. Id. at 714. 
 52. Id. at 730. 
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the freedom.53 Madame Justice McLachlin, in her dissenting judg-
ment, agreed that preventing the spread of hateful ideas was an im-
portant end but doubted that a criminal prohibition would advance 
this end effectively and at minimal cost to freedom of expression.54 
 At the outset of his section 1 analysis, Chief Justice Dickson de-
scribed the harms caused by “hate propaganda.”55 He referred first to 
the emotional or psychological injury experienced by the target 
group.56 “It is indisputable,” he said, “that the emotional damage 
caused by words may be of grave psychological and social conse-
quence.”57 The “derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate 
propaganda . . . [has] a severely negative impact on” an individual 
target group member because her “sense of human dignity and be-
longing to the community at large is closely linked to the concern and 
respect accorded the groups to which she belongs.”58 Because the 
identity of an individual is partly constituted by his association and 
interaction with others, he experiences attacks on the groups to 
which he belongs personally and sometimes very deeply.59 Because 
an individual’s sense of self is shaped in important ways by the views 
and actions of others, attacks on her most important associations will 
cause injury to her self-worth or dignity.60  
 The second injury or harm identified by Chief Justice Dickson is 
the harm that hate speech has upon “society at large.”61 If members 
of the larger community are persuaded by the message of hate 
speech, they may engage in acts of violence and discrimination, caus-
ing “serious discord” in the community.62 
 The majority judgment, upholding the hate promotion provision of 
the Criminal Code, rested on two important determinations. First, 
the majority accepted that there is a causal link between the expres-
sion of racist views and the spread of hatred in the community.63 Sec-
ond, the majority considered that the restriction is narrow in its 
scope and catches “only the most intentionally extreme forms of ex-
pression.”64 In the majority’s view, the state is justified in restricting 
the expression of the extreme racist views of hatemongers such as 
Keegstra because such views may lead (cause) others to hate the 
                                                                                                      
 53. Id. at 766. 
 54. Id. at 852-53 (McLachlin, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 744-45 (majority opinion). 
 56. Id. at 746. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 746-47. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 747. 
 62. Id. at 747-48. 
 63. Id. at 746-47.  
 64. Id. at 783.  
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members of the targeted group and to act towards them in a violent 
or discriminatory way or because these views may be internalized by 
group members, damaging their self-esteem.65 The majority accepted 
that there is a causal link between expression and the spread of hate 
because it was skeptical about the role of rational agency in the 
communicative process, at least in certain circumstances.66 According 
to the majority, drawing on the report of the Cohen Commission, “in-
dividuals can be persuaded to believe ‘almost anything’ . . . if infor-
mation or ideas are communicated using the right technique and in 
the proper circumstances,”67 and so it is important not to “overplay 
the view that rationality will overcome all falsehoods in the unregu-
lated marketplace of ideas.”68 
 The majority accepted that the hate promotion provision restricts 
only a narrow category of expression.69 Merely unpopular or uncon-
ventional communications are not caught by the ban.70 Hatred is an 
emotion that is “intense and extreme” in character: “To promote ha-
tred is to instil detestation, enmity, ill-will and malevolence in an-
other.”71 The majority judgment assumed that only extreme state-
ments would cause these extreme feelings.72  
 The majority also noted that the restriction applies only when an 
individual wilfully promotes hatred.73 The speaker must intend to 
promote hatred or must recognize that the promotion of hatred is the 
likely consequence of his expression.74 This mental element, said the 
majority, ensures that only the most extreme statements will be 
caught by the Code provision.75 The section will be breached “only 
where an accused subjectively desires the promotion of hatred or fo-
resees such a consequence as certain or substantially certain to re-
                                                                                                      
 65. Id. at 746-48. 
 66. Id. at 747-48. 
 67.  Id. at 747.  
 68. Id. at 763. Chief Justice Dickson thought that the restriction of hate promotion 
rests on the fallibility of human reason in exceptional circumstances:  
The successes of modern advertising, the triumphs of impudent propaganda 
such as Hitler’s, have qualified sharply our belief in the rationality of man. We 
know that under strain and pressure in times of irritation and frustration, the 
individual is swayed and even swept away by hysterical, emotional appeals. We 
act irresponsibly if we ignore the way in which emotion can drive reason from 
the field. 
Id. at 747 (quoting the REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON HATE PROPAGANDA IN CANADA 8 
(Queen’s Printer, Ottawa 1966) [Cohen Commission]). 
 69. Id. at 783.  
 70. Id. at 771-73. 
 71. Id. at 777 (quoting R. v. Andrews, [1988] 65 O.R. (2d) 161, 179 (Can.)). 
 72. Id. at 777-78. 
 73. Id. at 773. 
 74. Id. at 774-75. 
 75. Id. at 775. 
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sult from [the communication].”76 The majority acknowledged that 
the causal link between a particular act of expression and the spread 
of hatred in the community is difficult to establish.77 According to the 
majority, it is enough that the speaker knows or is aware that her 
expression creates a substantial risk that hatred will be spread or 
that acts of violence will increase78—“the hate-monger must intend or 
foresee as substantially certain a direct and active stimulation of ha-
tred against an identifiable group.”79 
 The majority’s emphasis on risk rather than cause and the stimu-
lation or circulation of hateful feelings rather than the creation of ha-
tred suggests some recognition that expression does not cause harm 
in a simple and predictable way. The impact of expression is unpre-
dictable and creates only a risk of harm because it depends on the 
reaction of audience members who bring a wide range of attitudes 
and assumptions to their assessment of the claims made. 
VI.   THE CHALLENGE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
 The court’s causal or behavioral approach seems incompatible 
with a commitment to freedom of expression—with the right of the 
individual to express and hear different views. If some individuals 
are persuaded of certain views, which they then act on, we might say 
that the expression has caused the action. However, under most ac-
counts of freedom of expression, the state is not justified in restrict-
ing expression simply because it causes harm in this way, by per-
suading its audience. The listener, and not the speaker, is responsi-
ble for the judgments he makes and the actions he takes.  
 In Keegstra, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada was 
prepared to treat hate speech as responsible for the spread of hatred 
and for increases in racist violence because they were skeptical that 
the audience would (always) exercise rational judgment when it con-
sidered racist claims—or because they were unwilling to take the 
risk that odious views might gain broader acceptance in the commu-
nity.80 Yet faith in human reason underlies most accounts of freedom 
of expression and cannot simply be cut out and discarded from the 
analysis. The implications of downplaying this faith in reason are 
enormous. Upon what is our commitment to freedom of expression 
based, if not on a belief in human reason and its power to recognize 
truth? What restrictions on expression are not acceptable once we 
have lost faith in human reason? If we are unwilling to trust, or give 
                                                                                                      
 76. Id. at 774. 
 77. Id. at 775-76. 
 78. Id. at 775-77. 
 79. Id. at 777. 
 80. Id. at 747-48. 
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space to, individual judgment and public reason, then the question of 
censorship will turn simply on whether the particular expression 
conveys a good or bad message or whether we think that public ac-
ceptance of the message will have good or bad consequences. But this 
amounts to a rejection of freedom of expression as a politi-
cal/constitutional principle. A commitment to freedom of expression 
means protecting expression for reasons more basic than our agree-
ment with its message, for reasons independent of its content.  
 If the courts are to address the harm of hate promotion without 
undermining the constitutional commitment to freedom of expres-
sion, they must isolate a category of hateful or extreme expression 
from ordinary public discourse, because of its irrational appeal or be-
cause it occurs in circumstances where rational agency is less likely 
to prevail. If a particular instance or form of expression (in a particu-
lar context) does not engage the audience or contribute to public re-
flection and judgment, but instead incites or manipulates its audi-
ence, then it may not deserve constitutional protection. Perhaps 
then, it is not a coincidence that two of the leading hate speech cases 
in Canada involve teachers.81 Keegstra, for example, used his author-
ity as a teacher to limit the opportunity of his students to critically 
evaluate his views.82  
 When the majority judgment in Keegstra sought to isolate the 
category of racist expression caught by the Criminal Code, it focused 
on the nature or content of the speech and not on the character of the 
relationship between the speaker and his or her audience.83 Chief 
Justice Dickson assumed that extreme statements (statements that 
are hateful in content and tone) cause hateful views. He assumed 
that extreme racist views are manipulative or misleading. Yet he did 
not explain what makes them so or how they could be distinguished 
from ordinary nonmanipulative expression. 
 The majority’s focus on extreme statements makes sense only if 
we believe that individual acts of expression create hatred in the 
community in a discrete and measurable way. Yet it cannot be the 
case that any particular hateful statement silences the members of a 
target group (damages their self-esteem so that they withdraw from 
public discourse) or leads to their unequal treatment (convinces oth-
ers that they are undeserving of equal respect). It is difficult to imag-
ine that the bizarre views of Keegstra would be taken seriously by 
                                                                                                      
 81. Ross v. NB School District No. 15 is the other noteworthy case involving a teacher. 
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (Can.). In Ross, the court noted that “[y]oung children are especially 
vulnerable to the messages conveyed by their teachers . . . [since] they are unlikely to dis-
tinguish between falsehoods and truth and more likely to accept derogatory views es-
poused by a teacher.” Id. at 873-74. 
 82. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 714. 
 83. Id. at 729.  
2008]                   HATE SPEECH REGULATION IN CANADA 91 
 
anyone who was not already deeply mired in irrational hatred or who 
was not limited in his or her capacity for reasoned thought or who 
was not in a subordinate or vulnerable position in relation to the 
speaker. If silencing or inequality occurs, it must be the consequence 
of a system of racist expression and action and not of a narrow cate-
gory of extreme statements. If the problem is systemic, how are we to 
identify a narrow category of expression that causes harm and 
should be restricted?  
VII.   THE LINE-DRAWING PROBLEM 
 The problem of line-drawing plays a key role in the argument 
against the restriction of hate promotion. Indeed, the line-drawing 
argument often seems to substitute for a more direct claim that the 
freedom should protect the expression of all viewpoints, no matter 
how wrong or offensive. Madame Justice McLachlin, in her dissent-
ing judgment in Keegstra, argued against the criminal restriction of 
hate promotion, not by focusing on the value of this expression, but 
rather by pointing out how difficult it is to draw a line separating 
hate promotion from other forms of expression.84 She was concerned 
that the line may be drawn in the wrong place so that valuable ex-
pression is restricted.85 As well, she was concerned about the “chilling 
effect” of any line that may be drawn.86 An individual may be reluc-
tant to publish material, even valuable material, that should not, 
and probably would not, be restricted because she is unwilling to 
take the risk that it might fall within a criminal prohibition that 
does not have a clear and uncontested scope.87 An individual who is 
critical of the members of a particular group or who engages in re-
search concerning the different characteristics of racial/ethnic groups 
will “think twice” about what he says and may even decide to remain 
silent because he fears that his expression might fall within this 
vague prohibition.88 
 In support of this concern, Madame Justice McLachlin referred to 
the “track record” of section 319(2).89 She noted that, in the past, the 
section “has provoked many questionable actions on the part of the 
authorities.”90 For example, the novels The Haj by Leon Uris91 and 
The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie92 were investigated and/or 
                                                                                                      
 84. Id. at 856-58 (McLachlin, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 858-59. 
 86. Id. at 859-60. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 860. 
 89. Id. at 859. 
 90. Id. 
 91. LEON URIS, THE HAJ (1984). 
 92. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1988). 
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temporarily interfered with under customs restrictions.93 Following 
investigation, the authorities concluded that neither of these books 
fell within the scope of the restriction.94 However, for Madame Jus-
tice McLachlin, the temporary interference with these books by cus-
toms officials illustrated the uncertain application of the restriction 
and helped to create a climate in which writers have genuine con-
cerns that their work may result in criminal punishment.95  
 The way the line-drawing argument is stated, it sounds as if ex-
pression that has little or no value must be protected to ensure that 
valuable expression is also protected. Keegstra’s Holocaust denial 
and Jewish conspiracy expression must be protected if we are to en-
sure that Uris is not prevented or discouraged from writing The Haj. 
But if Keegstra’s expression is of little or no value and Uris’s expres-
sion is clearly valuable, then why is it so difficult to draw a line      
between them? 
 The protection of hate speech must rest on more than its strategic 
significance. Protection must be based on a belief that hate speech is 
itself valuable, that it advances freedom of expression values, even 
though its message is wrong and offensive. (Indeed, if hate speech is 
itself without value, then it would be both possible and important to 
draw a line separating it from valuable forms of expression). The ar-
gument must be that racist speech should be protected because it ex-
presses the thoughts and feelings of the speaker and provides infor-
mation and ideas to an audience, who may decide either to accept or 
reject what they hear. The familiar freedom of expression argument 
is that these claims, absurd and offensive as they may be, should be 
responded to and not simply censored out of public discourse. 
 I suspect that the line-drawing problem is not, as Madame Justice 
McLachlin suggested, that the line between legitimate and illegiti-
mate expression may be drawn in the wrong place by the legislature 
or the courts, or that even if the line is drawn in the right place, it 
may have a chilling effect on legitimate expression.96 The problem is, 
rather, that the distinction between what in her example is assumed 
to be legitimate expression and what is assumed to be illegitimate 
expression is not all that clear. What Keegstra says is, in many ways, 
similar to what Uris writes. This is why it is difficult to draw a line 
between them. This is why the censorship of Keegstra’s speech puts 
the writing of Uris at risk. 
 
 
                                                                                                      
 93. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 859. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 859-60. 
 96. Id. 
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 There are differences between what Keegstra says and what Uris 
writes. Keegstra, in contrast to Uris, makes specific racist claims 
that are extreme and bizarre. But Uris’s writing is most certainly not 
free of the taint of prejudice. Indeed, the writing of Uris represents a 
powerful vehicle for the transmission and reinforcement of bigoted 
attitudes. In The Haj, Uris builds ethnic/racial stereotypes into the 
characters and events of a fast paced narrative.97 The Jewish charac-
ters in his book are heroic and honorable, while the Arab characters 
are cowardly and dishonest.98 Yet because these are just the attrib-
utes of the particular characters in a work of historical fiction, they 
are not explicit claims about Jews and Arabs that are open to consid-
eration and debate by the readers. The writing of Uris supports and 
revitalizes ethnic/racial stereotypes not by argument, but simply by 
weaving them into a “realistic” narrative that is read by a            
large audience. 
 Is the answer simply to exclude both Uris and Keegstra from free-
dom of expression’s protection? Keegstra makes racist claims that 
play on the fears and prejudices of some members of the community. 
Uris’s narrative builds on ethnic and religious stereotypes, which 
may be assimilated by the reader without conscious, or at least care-
ful, consideration. The line-drawing problem, however, is not re-
solved by redrawing the line in another place. The problem is much 
deeper than the unclear distinction between what Keegstra says and 
what Uris writes. Madame Justice McLachlin has not simply chosen 
a bad example with The Haj. Racial and other stereotypes are so 
deeply entrenched in our culture, our language, and our thinking 
that it is impossible to isolate clearly the offensive claims of Keegstra 
and the offensive stereotyping of Uris from ordinary public discourse. 
A wide range of expression, both extreme and ordinary, conveys rac-
ist attitudes and contributes to the spread or reinforcement of racist 
opinion in the community. This is the real line-drawing problem. It is 
much deeper than Madame Justice McLachlin supposes.  
 Yet, at the same time, recognition that line-drawing is a problem 
because racial and other stereotypes are pervasive may provide some 
support for the restriction of (extreme) racist expression. The line-
                                                                                                      
 97. See URIS, supra note 91. In The Haj, a variety of objectionable statements are 
made about the Arab personality: “The short fuse that every Arab carries in his guts had 
been ignited with consummate ease. Enraged mobs poured into the streets . . . .” Id. at 89. 
“The Bedouin was thief, assassin and raider and hard labour was immoral.” Id. at 29. “So 
before I was nine I had learned the basic canon of Arab life. It was me against my brother; 
me and my brother against our father; my family against my cousins and the clan; the clan 
against the tribe; and the tribe against the world.” Id. at 25. 
 More significant than these descriptions of the Arab personality are the actions of 
the different characters in the story. In contrast to the Jewish characters, Arab characters 
lie, cheat, rape, and attack for little or no reason. 
 98. See id. 
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drawing argument can be turned on its head once we understand 
why line-drawing is so difficult. Keegstra’s hateful expression is diffi-
cult to isolate from ordinary public discourse because racist expres-
sion and thinking are pervasive. His expression may also be more 
dangerous because of this pervasiveness.  
 Keegstra’s audience understands and evaluates his claims against 
this larger background of racist assumptions. Racist claims often 
play to fears and frustrations (of moral decay or unemployment) in a 
context where the space for critical reflection is reduced. These 
claims draw on the social background of bigotry and racial stereotyp-
ing, of which Uris’s novel The Haj is only a very small part. Against 
this background, a racist claim may (to some at least) seem an ordi-
nary part of discourse. Indeed, to some members of the community, 
even the absurd claims of Keegstra may seem reasonable or plausi-
ble. A general audience may be less critical of racist claims, which 
provide a channel for fear and resentment and which resonate with 
widely shared assumptions. Racist claims may resist critical evalua-
tion because they give shape to popular but inchoate assumptions 
and attitudes. Similarly, the dominance of racist imagery and mes-
sages means that the members of target groups have little space to 
negotiate their identity, their place in the world.  
 Less extreme racist claims only seem “ordinary” because they re-
flect, or resonate with, common opinion. All racist expression, the ex-
treme and the commonplace, takes place in a larger culture of racist 
attitudes and assumptions and contributes to the reproduction of this 
larger culture. It is arguable that common forms of racist expression 
are more harmful because their exposure is greater and their racist 
message is less obvious. Yet, any attempt to exclude all racist or big-
oted expression from public discourse would require extraordinary 
intervention by the state. Moreover, public discussion of racial issues 
is vital precisely because these attitudes and assumptions are so per-
vasive. However, even if we accept that ordinary or commonplace 
racist claims and attitudes should be discussed and addressed and 
not simply censored out of public discourse, a sensitivity to the limits 
of reason, to the subtle or implicit form racist claims often take, and 
to the significant harm they cause should lead us to pay more atten-
tion to inequalities in communicative power or opportunity. 
 There may, however, be stronger reasons to restrict more extreme 
racist claims that either explicitly or implicitly advocate violence 
against the members of a minority group. While most members of the 
community will dismiss the extreme claims of hatemongers like 
Keegstra as bizarre and irrational, some individuals, already 
weighed down by prejudice or susceptible to manipulation or already 
part of an extremist subculture, will see in these claims a plausible 
account of their social and economic difficulties and a justification for 
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radical action. Hate speech offers a focus for their feelings of resent-
ment and frustration. It builds on existing racist attitudes and so 
leads to more extreme opinions and actions, particularly in times of 
great insecurity. Its extreme character calls for action against mem-
bers of the hated group. Any individual who accepts the views pre-
sented by Keegstra and other hatemongers would also have to con-
clude that radical action was called for.  
 Nevertheless, restricting hate promotion, whether narrowly or 
broadly defined, is very different from prohibiting the false yell of 
“fire” in a crowded theatre, the classic American example of an ex-
ception to freedom of expression protection.99 The yell of fire in a 
crowded theatre occurs as an identifiable and discrete deviation from 
the conditions of ordinary public discourse. The theatre audience 
does not have the time or space to stop and think carefully before act-
ing on the communicated message. The panic that will follow the yell 
of fire in these circumstances is likely to result in injury. The court in 
Keegstra, however, based its decision not on any exceptional and 
temporary circumstances that might distort or limit the audience’s 
ability to rationally assess the message conveyed to them, but rather 
on a general skepticism about the exercise of human reason in a rac-
ist culture.100 The concern is that certain ways of thinking about race 
are so deeply embedded in our culture, in its linguistic forms and 
popular concepts, that racist claims often go unexamined and are dif-
ficult to challenge. This skepticism, though, raises questions about 
the protection of any (negative) claim about race and not just the ex-
treme claims of people like Keegstra. In the end, though, the censor-
ship of extreme expression may rest simply on our unwillingness as a 
community to take the risk that the advocacy of racial violence will 
fall on deaf ears. 
VIII.   A GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 In the United States, debate about the appropriate limits on 
speech revolves around the question of whether or not the speech 
goes too far and disrupts the security or stability of the community 
by inciting members of the public to harmful action or deceiving 
them on an important public matter. The paradigmatic speaker in 
American free speech jurisprudence is the lone dissident who con-
fronts or challenges state power or dominant ideologies. He or she 
should be free to speak and to challenge convention, unless his or her 
words go too far and provoke violence or threaten community secu-
rity or stability.   
                                                                                                      
 99. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 100. See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 746-48. 
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 In Canada, the freedom of expression debate is often framed in 
similar terms. Yet it may be that an entirely different sort of concern 
underlies the freedom of expression decisions of the Canadian courts. 
While the courts describe certain instances of racist, pornographic, or 
commercial expression as going too far and as appropriately subject 
to restriction, these forms of expression can only be understood as 
harmful if we see them as part of a systemic practice. The courts 
support the restriction of extreme expression or expression that goes 
too far (ads for dangerous products, violent sexual images, or ex-
treme racist statements). However, the justification for restriction of 
these extreme statements depends not simply on their form, but also 
on the domination of public discourse by a narrow range of voices and 
views—the overwhelming presence in our public discourse (the mass 
marketing) of degrading sexual imagery or racist stereotypes or life-
style product associations.  
 The extreme racist remarks of someone like Keegstra may affect 
the thinking and behavior of some members of the public only be-
cause racist expression (albeit less extreme) permeates public dis-
course. As well, ads for harmful products such as cigarettes are effec-
tive not simply because of their lifestyle form but also because com-
mercial advertising so completely dominates public discourse. At one 
level, the issue in these cases is whether a particular instance of ex-
pression goes too far and causes harm to important human interests; 
at a deeper level, the issue is whether certain forms of expression, or 
certain messages or perspectives, so completely dominate public dis-
course that the space for critical judgment by the individual is com-
pressed. In such a context, the concern is that (extremist) speech no 
longer appeals or contributes to independent reflection                   
and judgment. 
 More speech is not always an answer when communicative re-
sources are controlled by a small number of corporations and public 
discourse operates on marketing principles. Unable or unwilling to 
respond directly to the larger problem of the imbalance of communi-
cative power and the rise of advertising as the paradigm of public 
communication, legislatures and courts address the worst and most 
obvious excesses of public discourse by supporting content restric-
tions on extreme expression. This response leaves the larger prob-
lems with public discourse substantially untouched. At the same 
time, however, because the line between extreme and ordinary is un-
clear—a matter of degree—the courts’ approach puts the protection 
of all expression on unstable ground. The challenge for the courts is 
to maintain a clear and protected space for freedom of expression in a 
world where reason is imperfect and often not the object of expres-
sion, where individuals sometimes seem pushed and pulled by com-
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municative forces, and where fundamental imbalances in communi-
cative power seem either natural or unchallengeable. 
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